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Abstract. The Philippines and South Korea have long had difficult corruption problems. More
recently, both have experienced significant democratization. This article compares the two
cases, first developing an analysis of corruption in each country, then laying out their reform
strategies and assessing their effectiveness, and finally exploring the contrasting relationships
between democratization and corruption that are found in these countries. The Philippines
confront reformers with more difficult challenges, beginning with the size and decentralization
of the society, but other contrasts are important as well. The political will required to produce
successful reform has been lacking in the Philippines, for a variety of reasons, while recent
anti-corruption initiatives in Korea have had stronger backing. Recent Korean reforms also
emulate the successful approaches of Singapore and Hong Kong in important ways. By itself,
democratization will not check corruption in either country, but where reform is accompanied
by significant resources and where democratic accountability complements political will –
more true of Korea than of the Philippines – significant progress can be made.
Introduction
In recent years, two important but contradictory trends have affected many
countries. The first has been what Huntington (1991) has termed the “Third
Wave” of democratization. The second is the tidal wave of corruption scan-
dals around the world, which Moises Naim called the “corruption eruption”
(quoted in Leiken, 1996–1997: 56). Coverage of corruption in the Economist,
the Financial Times, and the New York Times quadrupled between 1984 and
1995 (Rossant, 1995: 58). There are two reasons for the global exposure of
corruption scandals. First is the end of the Cold War and the emergence of
civil societies in many countries. Second is the trend toward democracy and
markets, which paradoxically has “increased both the opportunities for graft
and the likelihood of exposure” (Leiken, 1996–1997: 58).
This article focuses on the experiences of two Asian countries in combat-
ing corruption as their political systems became more democratic. In 1986,
Corazon Aquino replaced Ferdinand Marcos as President in the Philippines,
ending 14 years of martial law and authoritarian rule. South Korea adopted
democracy on June 29, 1987, with President Ro Tae Woo’s Democratic Dec-
laration. Based on Transparency International’s first Corruption Perception
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Index (CPI) in 1995, Arnold J. Heidenheimer (1996: 338) classified the 41
countries surveyed into three groups: least corrupt, somewhat corrupt, and
quite corrupt. South Korea’s 27th position and Philippines’ 36th position
placed both in the “quite corrupt” category.1 This article has three aims. First,
it analyzes the problem of corruption in the “quite corrupt” Philippines and
South Korea. Second, it compares and evaluates the effectiveness of the anti-
corruption strategies in these two countries. Finally, the article concludes by
assessing whether the development of democracy has exacerbated or mini-
mized corruption in these countries.2
Before proceeding, it is necessary to define three key concepts: corruption,
democracy, and democratization. Heidenheimer (1970: 4–6) has identified
three types of social science definitions of corruption: public-office-centered
definitions, market-centred definitions, and public-interest-centered defini-
tions. For this article a public-office-centered definition is most relevant and
useful. Corruption refers to “the misuse of public power, office or authority
for private benefit—through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism,
fraud, speed money or embezzlement” (UNDP, 1999: 7). Democracy is de-
fined “minimally as a political system in which free and fair elections inclusive
of all social groups are held regularly and basic civil and political liberties are
respected” (Lipset, 1998: xiii). Democratization is “the process of building
a democracy following the collapse of a non-democratic regime” (Sodaro,
2001: 215).
Corruption in the Philippines
Corruption was introduced to the Philippines by the Spanish as the “low
salaries and poor working conditions of the bureaucrats and the many oppor-
tunities available for corrupt behaviour contributed to the widespread corrup-
tion in the colonial bureaucracy” (Quah, 1982: 158). As a public office was
viewed as a grant or favor from the King during the Spanish colonial period,
“many bureaucrats actually treated the transaction as a business—selling an
office at a profit and buying a more lucrative one” (Endriga, 1979: 247–249).
In short, graft and corruption were rampant during the Spanish colonial pe-
riod. The Americans replaced the Spanish in 1898 and the “bureaucracy as a
whole was quite clean during this period” because the bureaucrats were paid
higher salaries and corrupt civil servants were promptly prosecuted (Quah,
1982: 159).
After World War II, however, the bureaucracy in the Philippines suffered
from “low prestige, incompetence, meager resources, and a large measure
of cynical corruption” (Corpuz, 1957: 222–223). Bureaucratic corruption be-
came a serious problem during the 1950s, especially during the administration
DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION 63
of President Elpidio Quirino (1948–1953), because corruption “permeated the
entire gamut of the Philippine bureaucracy, extending from the lowest level
of the civil service to the top, excepting the President himself” (Alfiler, 1979:
323). In May, 1950, President Quirino created an Integrity Board consisting
of five members to investigate complaints of graft and corruption against civil
servants. However, a lack of public support led to its dissolution 5 months
later (Quah, 1982: 159).
After winning the 1953 presidential election Ramon Magsaysay estab-
lished the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC) to reduce
inefficiency and dishonesty in the civil service, and issued Administrative
Order No. 1 to prevent public officials from participating in certain types of
official transactions with their real or imaginary relatives. Magsaysay’s
untimely death in 1957 led to the emergence of the Garcia administration
(1957–1962), which abolished the PCAC and replaced it with the Presidential
Committee on Administration Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) and the
Presidential Fact-Finding Committee (PFFC) in 1958 to implement the
government’s anti-graft campaign. In February, 1960, Garcia introduced
a third agency known as the Presidential Anti-Graft Committee (PAGC)
(Alfiler, 1979: 331–337).
President Garcia was succeeded by President Diosdado Macapagal, who
served from 1962 to 1965. Magapagal created the Presidential Anti-Graft
Committee or PAGCOM. In 1965, Ferdinand Marcos replaced Macapagal as
President and replaced PAGCOM with the Presidential Agency on Reforms
and Government Operations (PARGO) in January 1966. Three other agencies
were set up to assist PARGO: the Presidential Complaints and Action Office
(PCAO), the Complaints and Investigations Office (CIO), and the Special
Cabinet Committee in Backsliding (Alfiler, 1979: 339–346).
President Marcos’s declaration of martial law on September 22, 1972
“ended over a quarter century of robust, if often irresponsible and elitist,
democratic politics” (Timberman, 1991: 75). Aquino described the Philip-
pines under Marcos as the “Politics of Plunder”:
His declaration of martial law in 1972 under false pretexts not only pro-
tected the fortune he had already acquired, most illicitly over the past two
decades. It also served to accelerate the amassing of even more power and
wealth for several more years. . . . He lorded it [the economy] over a rapa-
cious team of trusted friends and associates whom he had given lucrative
fiefdoms in the economy. Together they stole high and low, from both rich
and poor. They treated the Philippine treasury as if it were their personal
checking account. The consuming preoccupation with wealth accumula-
tion was abetted by multi-million international loans and massive U.S.
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foreign assistance packages that were meant for economic development.
These resources provided easy opportunities for massive graft. As long as
they were available, the stealing by Marcos and his cronies went unabated.
. . . In the end, the Philippines had been bled of billions of dollars and
had become the “basket case of Asia” by the late 1970s (Aquino, 1987:
116–117).
Similarly, Varela (1995: 174) contended that “graft and corruption reached
its all time high” during Marcos’s martial law regime as both “had permeated
almost all aspects of bureaucratic life and institutions which saw the start of
the systematic plunder of the country.”
The Philippines has thus relied on 7 laws and 13 anti-graft agencies since
it initiated its fight against corruption in the 1950s (Quah, 1999a: 19). The
proliferation of anti-graft agencies is the result of the frequent changes in
political leadership as these agencies are either created or abolished by the
President. From 1950 to 1966, five anti-corruption agencies were formed and
dissolved as a result of five changes in political leadership. Similarly, President
Marcos created another five anti-graft agencies during his two decades in
power. The first three were ineffective and lasted between 8 months and 2 years
(Quah, 1982: 168–169). In 1979 President Marcos formed the Sandiganbayan
(Special Anti-Graft Court) and the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) by Presidential
Decrees.
When President Aquino assumed office in February, 1986, “there was
high expectation that the end of the culture of graft and corruption was near”
(Varela, 1995: 174). She established the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to identify and retrieve the money stolen by the Marcos
family and its cronies. Unfortunately, Aquino’s “avowed anti-graft and cor-
ruption” stance was viewed cynically by the public as two of her cabinet
members and her relatives were accused of corruption. The PCGG itself was
also charged with corruption, favoritism and incompetence: by 1988, five of
its agents faced graft charges and 13 more were being investigated. In 1987
Aquino created the Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountabil-
ity (PCPEA) to respond to increasing public criticism. However, the PCPEA
was also ineffective as it lacked personnel and funds.
In short, Aquino’s “honesty has not been matched by the political will to
punish the corrupt” (Timberman, 1991: 235). Her ineffectiveness was mani-
fested in the declining numbers of citizens satisfied with the performance of
her administration in tackling corruption—from 72% in March, 1987, to 26%
in July, 1989. While Aquino herself had “shared the people’s exasperation and
despair that she could not achieve the very thing that she wanted to leave as a
legacy: a clean and accountable government” (Carino, 1994: 113). According
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to Reid and Guerrero (1995: 2) Aquino “left behind a mixed legacy . . . The
democratic institutions she struggled to rebuild remained flawed and weak.
Corruption prevailed, and Filipinos were increasingly cynical about the state
of their nation.”
The Tanodbayan or Office of the Ombudsman was “reborn” in 1988 during
Aquino’s term of office. However, Balgos (1998: 247) notes that “during
the first seven years after its rebirth in 1988, the Office of the Ombudsman
failed to attract much public scrutiny, the limelight hogged by the more high-
profile Sandiganbayan.” However, instead of “inspiring confidence in the
judicial system,” the Ombudsman has elicited “only disappointment—if not
contempt—among many of those seeking redress for the wrong done them
by public officials.” Indeed, the Ombudsman has a notorious reputation for
taking a long time in processing the complaints received by it” (Balgos, 1998:
248).
A more serious weakness was caused by a case-quota system introduced
by Conrado Vasquez, who was appointed as Ombudsman in 1988. This quota
system encouraged inefficiency as investigators “finished the easier cases first
to fulfill their quota” and left the more complex ones “untouched for months, or
even years.” By December, 1994, the Ombudsman had accumulated a backlog
of 14,652 cases, or 65% of its total workload. In 1997, the Ombudsman still
had pending cases dating back to 1979. The Sandiganbayan’s record is worse
than the Ombudsman as it completed only 13% of its total caseload in 1996
(Balgos, 1998: 250–251).
In 1992 Fidel Ramos was elected president for a 6-year term. He created
the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) in 1994
to investigate violations of the anti-graft laws by presidential appointees and
appointed Eufemio Domingo as its chairman. In 1997, Domingo lamented
that
[T]he system is not working. We are not making it work . . . We have
all the laws, rules and regulations and especially institutions not only to
curb, but to eliminate, corruption. The problem is that these laws, rules
and regulations are not being faithfully implemented. . . . I am afraid that
many people are accepting (corruption) as another part of our way of life.
Big-time grafters are lionised in society. They are invited to all sorts of
social events, elected and re-elected to government offices. It is considered
an honor—in fact a social distinction—to have them as guests in family
and community affairs (Balgos, 1998: 267–268).
Joseph Estrada succeeded Ramos as president, and in his 1998 State of the
Nation Address identified the struggle against graft and corruption as his major
priority. In early 1999, he requested the World Bank to make recommendations
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to help his government strengthen its fight against corruption. The World Bank
submitted preliminary findings in 1999, recommending “a national strategy
for fighting corruption in the Philippines” by “reducing opportunities and
motivation for corruption” and making “corruption a high-risk, low-reward
activity” (Bhargava, 1999: 1, 5).
During 2000 the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ)
initiated a detailed investigation on the president’s wealth, finding that Estrada,
his wives and his children were listed as incorporators or board members of
66 companies. In 1999, Estrada had declared in his statement of assets a net
worth of P35.8 million and in his income tax return, a net income of only P2.3
million. However, his 1999 official asset declaration could not account for the
source of the funds invested in these companies as 14 of them had assets of
over P600 million (Coronel, 2000: 42–43).
The Financial Times reported in 2000 that “perceived corruption in the
Philippines reached its highest levels in two decades in 1998 and 1999, the first
2 years of the Estrada administration” (Lande, 2001: 92). In October of that
year Senate Minority Leader Teofisto Guingona accused Estrada of receiving
“large cash payouts from jueteng, an illegal numbers game.” An Estrada crony,
Governor Luis Singson, “claimed that he had given the president 400 million
pesos (US$ 10 million) from jueteng collections nationwide” (Lande, 2001:
92). Singson’s “revelations triggered a major political earthquake” (Magno,
2001: 259).
According to Lande (2001: 92), “it was Estrada’s mismanagement of the
economy that most decisively turned the upper and middle classes against
him.” Moreover, the business community did not accept cronyism and its
members were disturbed by the preferential treatment given Estrada’s friends.
However, “the last straw was the revelation that he himself was brazenly cor-
rupt” (Lande, 2001: 92). The minority members of the House of Representa-
tives initiated impeachment proceedings against the president. During the trial
Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice-president of PCI-Equitable Bank, informed the
court that Estrada, “under a false identity, was the true owner of several bank
accounts holding hundred of millions of pesos” (Magno, 2001: 251). The trial
was covered live by the media and “broke all audience records” because it
was “a telenovela that outclassed all the others simply because it was real” . . .
it became “the single most important educational event on civics and the rule
of law in Philippine political history” as it “was a large classroom where the
weaknesses of institutions were exposed and the innermost secrets of political
corruption revealed” (Magno, 2001: 260, 262).
On January 16, 2001, two pro-Estrada senators prevented “damning evi-
dence” from being revealed in the trial, which “provoked a firestorm of pub-
lic outrage. The House prosecutors walked out in disgust. Senate president
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Pimentel resigned. Civil society exploded in nonviolent anger and, acting
where the Senate had failed to act, moved over 5 days of massive demonstra-
tions to force the president from office” (Lande, 2001: 94). Four days later
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President after Estrada agreed to
resign when the military withdrew its support. In her inaugural speech, Pres-
ident Arroyo emphasized that one of four core goals was to “improve moral
standards in government and society, in order to provide a strong foundation
for good governance.” It is, of course, premature to assess President Arroyo’s
record as she has been in office for only a few years. However, Sheila Coronel,
Executive Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, ob-
serves that Arroyo’s government was unlikely to be “reformist” as “I was at
her headquarters and I could see the old faces coming out, people who have
been accused of corruption in the past” (Sheehan, 2001: 17).
Corruption in South Korea
Corruption is a serious problem in South Korea, judging from the spate of
scandals in recent years. According to Young Jong Kim (1994: 215), South
Korea has been described as “a ROTC (Republic of Total Corruption) by the
people and media.” Similarly, Kee Chul Hwang (1996: 107) contends there
was “unprecedented corruption” in South Korea as “the symbolic practice of
integrity and probity among public employees cannot easily be found.”
Historically, corruption was not a serious problem in South Korea during
the first half of the Yi Dynasty (1392–1910) as the “internal controls against
anti-corruption behavior worked effectively until the beginning of the 16th
century” (Rahman, 1986: 117–118). However, the participation of the King’s
relatives in politics and government from the 16th century onwards led to
“increasing nepotism and corruption in administration.” Another contributing
factor was the relaxation of the civil servants’ emphasis on rectitude and thrift
and their adoption of a luxurious lifestyle, which compelled them to rely
increasingly on “the abuse of power to accumulate wealth illegally” (Rahman,
1986: 119).
After independence in 1945, the South Korean government employed the
Criminal Code and administrative prohibitions to tackle the growing prob-
lem of corruption. All new presidents, upon taking office, promised to take
appropriate measures to eradicate corruption (Kim, 1997: 253). The began in
earnest with President Park Chung Hee. Park took office in 1961 after ousting
the government of Chang Myon because of its involvement in corruption,
its inability to defend the country from communism, and its incompetence
in initiating economic and social change (Han, 1989: 273). He created the
Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) in 1963 to act as a direct check on the
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economic bureaucracy (Hart-Landsberg, 1993: 54). The BAI was thus the first
de facto anti-corruption agency in South Korea.3 In 1975 Park introduced the
Seojungshaeshin (General Administration Reform) Movement to curb cor-
ruption in the civil service.4
Park’s assassination in 1979 led to the assumption of power a year
later by Chun Doo Hwan. He re-affirmed his government’s anti-corruption
stance by purging corrupt officials, introducing ethics laws to reward hon-
est officials, and enhancing civil service reforms (Jun, 1985: 63). However,
Chun’s government lacked legitimacy in the eyes of rival political parties,
student leaders, intellectuals, and progressive Christians (Han, 1989: 282–
284). Caiden and Kim (1993: 137–139) have criticised the Park and Chun
reforms as “sporadic, periodic, episodic, incidental and improvisatory, too cos-
metic and lip-serving, and for being implemented quickly and without careful
preparation.”
The peaceful transfer of power to President Roh Tae Woo in 1988 enabled
him to investigate abuses during his predecessor’s regime. During parliamen-
tary hearings in November and December, 1988, Chun, his two brothers, and
his wife’s family were accused of massive corruption. On November 23, 1988,
Chun and his wife apologised for their misbehaviour and returned 13.9 billion
won (US$ 20 million) to the government. The next year Chun’s brothers were
convicted for corruption and imprisoned:
What became apparent after Chun left office was the depth of corruption
and the degree to which it had been quietly tolerated, even expected. The
pervasive corruption is another of the ugly legacies bequeathed by the
Fifth Republic. Corruption had long been part of the Korean system, but
Chun did the country a tremendous disservice by allowing his relatives
to prosper. For all his faults, Park had never allowed his family to profit
personally from his position. Unfortunately, the Chun and Lee families
set an example of egregiously corrupt behavior that still undermines the
Korean social contract (Clifford, 1998: 287, emphasis added).
While Roh remained committed to democracy, he was nevertheless
plagued by political corruption, as six legislators were found guilty of extorting
funds from the business community. The Hanbo scandal of 1992 shocked the
country when Chung Tae Soo, chairman of the Hanbo Construction Company,
was accused of contributing substantial funds to the ruling and opposition po-
litical parties for favors involving land development (FEER, 1992: 138). Roh
himself was not immune: it was discovered in 1995 that major business con-
glomerates and numerous individuals had contributed almost US$ 600 million
to his private political fund, which he had used both to reward supporters and
for himself and his family (Macdonald and Clark, 1996: 159–160).
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When Kim Young Sam became the first civilian President in February,
1993, he launched an intensive anti-corruption campaign. He began with the
voluntary declaration of his personal assets and those of his extended fam-
ily, amounting to 1.77 billion won (or US$2 million) (Oh, 1999: 139). Kim
encouraged his cabinet colleagues and ruling party members to follow suit.
In 1993, the Public Officials’ Ethics Law was revised to institutionalise the
disclosure of public officials’ assets, and all senior officials were required to
register and periodically disclose their assets (Kim, 1997: 255). Kim gave up
golf, which had become a symbol of corporate–government cronyism and the
exchange of corrupt gifts (Sheridan, 1994: 15).
In 1993 Kim issued an emergency decree establishing a Real-Name Fi-
nancial Transaction System, which banned the use of anonymous financial
accounts and required individuals to use their own names for opening bank
accounts. Anonymous or false-name accounts had been the backbone of
the black economy and massive fraud, corruption and tax evasion schemes
(Sheridan, 1994: 15; Kim, 1997: 255). The “real name system” was Presi-
dent Kim’s “most potent antidote” to corruption as “the policy dealt a major
blow to the prevalent practice of amassing unearned income, and soliciting
bribes or political funds through fake or borrowed accounts. By using fake
or borrowed accounts, one achieved two goals at once: tax avoidance and
the concealment of the trail of recipients of the illicit monies” (Guerrero,
1999: 77).
In 1994 the Election for Public Office and Election Malpractice Prevention
Act was enacted to reduce corruption in politics by ensuring transparency
in campaign financing, limiting campaign expenditures, preventing electoral
irregularities, and imposing heavy penalties for offenders (Kim, 1997: 255).
However, the most important reforms introduced by President Kim were the
strengthening of the BAI and the creation of the Commission for the Prevention
of Corruption, which is an advisory body of private citizens formed to assist the
BAI’s chairman. The BAI performed three functions: to confirm the closing
accounts of the state’s revenues and expenditure; to audit a variety of state
organisations; and to inspect the work of government agencies and officials.
Its chairman was appointed by the president for 4 years with the consent of
the National Assembly (Kim, 1994: 218–219).
President Kim’s anti-corruption campaign confirmed that corruption was
a way of life and exposed its pervasiveness. Indeed, Kim “exposed more dirt
than the South Korean people had ever imagined or are comfortable with”
(Genzberger et al., 1994: 25). Unlike the earlier efforts of Rhee, Park and
Chun, which were ineffective because of the lack of political will (Kim, 1994:
207), Kim demonstrated his commitment by not obstructing the arrest and sen-
tencing of his son.5 Nevertheless, the Hanbo scandal and his son’s arrest and
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imprisonment had seriously undermined Kim’s legitimacy and jeopardised
the continued success of his anti-corruption drive (Kim, 1997: 255).
How effective were President Kim’s anti-corruption campaigns? The 1996
South Korean Democratization Survey found that 71% of respondents ex-
perienced some decrease in political corruption while only 4% reported an
increase. However, 49% and 36% of the respondents perceived the level of
corruption of Kim Young Sam’s government to be “high” or “very high”,
respectively (Shin, 1999: 212–214). Despite Kim’s efforts, “the age-old
custom of corruption was not dying at all in the South Korean political
marketplace: instead, the informal norms were still overpowering the for-
mal rules of the newly implanted democratic political game” (Shin, 1999:
214).
After assuming office on February 25, 1998, President Kim Dae Jung
announced a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy with the objectives of
ensuring clean and upright public office, transparent and reliable government,
and a just and fair society. The goal was to become a transparent state and
to improve South Korea’s ranking on Transparency International’s CPI from
43rd position in 1998 to 20th position by 2003 (Republic of Korea, 1999: 6).
Kim’s strategy has six components:
• Creating an Anti-Corruption Committee to co-ordinate programs and ac-
tivities; and formulating the Anti-Corruption Law to provide protection for
whistle-blowers, strengthen citizen participation, and reinforce detection
and punishment for corrupt practices.
• Reforming the attitudes and consciousness of public servants by enforcing
codes of conduct, education, and increasing the salaries of medium to low
level officials to match those in the private sector within 5 years.
• Promoting public awareness of corruption through the schools and other so-
cial and cultural centers, the use of mass media to publicize anti-corruption
materials, a national movement against corruption, and strengthened inter-
national cooperation.
• Forming a social and cultural environment against corruption through the
scrutiny and strict control of former government officials, enhancing the
transparency of private industries, and eroding collusion among politicians,
government officials and businessmen.
• Improving the reward/protection system for informers, activating citizen
watch groups to report corruption, creating a special inspection office to
focus on the corruption of senior officials, and increasing financial penalties
by retrieving personal gains and government losses.
• Initiating reforms in six corruption-prone areas: tax administration, con-
struction, housing, food and entertainment, environmental management,
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Table 1. Contextual constraints of the Philippines and South Korea.
Country Philippines South Korea
Land area 300,000 km2 99,274 km2
Population 76.8 million 46.8 million
GDP per capita US$ 1000 US$ 8690
Unemployment rate 9.4% 6.3%
Size of civil service 1,328,018 (1995) 900,000 (1996)
Civil service as % of population 1.9 2.0
Source: Andrews (2001: 158–159, 178–179), Asian Development Bank
(2000: 159, 269), and Burns and Bowornwathana (2001: Table 1.2).
and police work. More specifically, these reforms focused on implementing
deregulation, forming the Online Procedures Enhancement for Civil Appli-
cations (OPEN) system, reducing personal contacts between civil servants
and the public, and improving overall accountability (Republic of Korea,
1999: 9–22).
Implementation has not been easy. The proposed anti-corruption law met
with opposition in the National Assembly and was not enacted until 2001
(Republic of Korea, 2001). In January, 2002, however, the Korean Indepen-
dent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) became Korea’s de jure anti-
corruption agency.
Comparative analysis
To compare the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies in the Philippines
and South Korea it is first necessary to identify major contextual constraints.
Table 1 compares the two countries in terms of area, population, GNP per
capita, unemployment rate, size of the civil service, and the number of civil
servants per 1000 population. The policy context in South Korea is more
favourable for anti-corruption action than that in the Philippines for several
reasons. The Philippines is three times larger than South Korea in land area,
and its population is greater by 30 million people. In addition, the Philippines is
an archipelago of 7017 islands; fighting corruption is arduous in the provinces
and rural areas as the “boundaries of water and mountain make internal travel
and communication difficult” (Carino, 1988: 4–5).
Another advantage of South Korea is that it is more than eight times richer
than the Philippines with a GDP per capita of US$8690 in 1999. As the
Philippines also has more civil servants than South Korea, it will encounter
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more difficulty in raising the low salaries of its civil servants. As the unem-
ployment rate in the Philippines in 1999 was 9.4% compared to 6.3% for
South Korea, the Philippines would also have more difficulty in downsizing
its civil service. Finally, South Korea has a more homogeneous population
(99% are Korean) with Korean as the common language, and has given more
importance to education; it can thus spread the anti-corruption message more
easily throughout the country. Kang (2002: 22) notes other differences and
similarities. On one hand, “Korea is ethnically homogeneous, Confucian, and
geographically peninsular, whereas the Philippines is multiracial, culturally
diverse, and a series of islands.” On the other, both countries experienced oc-
cupation by the Japanese and by US soldiers after World War II, rely heavily
on external finance for their economic activities, and have been capitalist and
authoritarian.
Comparing levels of corruption
Any research on corruption faces major problems of measurement. Not only
is most corruption furtive by nature; those with knowledge of it may well
remain silent. Kee Chul Hwang (1996: 142, 235) found that Korean survey
respondents were reluctant to answer questions on the number of times they
had offered a bribe to a civil servant, the number of times they had received
a bribe when performing their duties, and their reaction if they had received
bribes. Thus, survey research methods cannot be used except indirectly. In his
study of police corruption in a northeastern city in the United States, Meyer
(1973: 39) relied on allegations of police corruption by the citizens and police
officers. His caution regarding the incomplete nature of his data should be
noted here:
It must be remembered that these data do not represent the true picture of
corruption. They do show the nature and extent of corruption as reported by
the various complainants. As such, the data show the picture of corruption
as was available to the police chief and his staff. They do not show if,
in fact, there was more corruption than was actually reported (emphasis
added).
Similarly, Young Jong Kim (1994: 102–103) compiled reports of bureau-
cratic corruption in two major South Korean newspapers for 6 years (1960–
1961, 1970–1971, and 1978–1979). Following Meyer, he warns his readers
that:
. . . the reported incidents do not necessarily reflect the reality of corrup-
tion phenomena in Korea, since the dark or hidden area of bureaucratic
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corruption (i.e., unreported and unknown incidents) might be in existence
behind the reported incidents (Kim, 1994: 112).
Such examples show that it is not possible to “measure” the actual level or
extent of corruption in a country as scholars usually rely on the reported extent
of corruption. Lancaster and Montinola (1997: 16) have recommended the CPI
published by Transparency International (TI) as a “robust” index that “captures
more than a single indicator” and “combines several measures of political
corruption for each country” (Lancaster and Montinola, 1997: 27–28). The
CPI is “an attempt to assess the level at which corruption is perceived by people
working for multinational firms and institutions as impacting on commercial
and social life” (TI, 1996: 5). The 2001 edition ranked 91 countries from 14
different surveys conducted by seven independent institutions among business
people, country analysts, and residents.6 Indeed, the CPI’s strength is based on
“the concept that a combination of data sources combined into a single index
increases the reliability of each individual figure” (Lambsdorff, 2001: 2).
From 1995 to 2001, the CPI ranking for South Korea has consistently been
better than that for the Philippines. The rank for the latter declined from 35th
least-corrupt in 1995 to 69th in 2000, and improved slightly to 65th in 2001. In
South Korea’s case, it was ranked 27th in 1995 and declined to 50th in 1999. Its
ranking during the last 2 years improved to 48th in 2000, and to 42nd in 2001.
In short, South Korea’s average ranking from 1995 to 2001 is 39th, which is
much higher than the Philippines’ average rank of 52nd for the same period.
The Philippines also trails South Korea in rankings published by the Hong
Kong-based Political Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC).7 Between 1995
and 2001, South Korea dropped from fourth to sixth, while the Philippines
dropped from eighth to nineth. On average, South Korea ranked sixth out of
12 countries while the Philippines were in seventh position.
Effectiveness of the anti-corruption strategies
South Korea’s higher rankings may well reflect more effective anti-corruption
measures, especially since Kim’s initiatives of 1999. The effectiveness of anti-
corruption measures depends on two factors: “(1) the adequacy of the measures
themselves in terms of the comprehensiveness of their scope and powers; and
(2) the level of commitment of the political leadership to the goal of eradicating
bureaucratic corruption in the country concerned” (Quah, 1982: 175).
There are three patterns of corruption control among the Asian countries
(Quah, 1999a: 14–26; Quah, 2001: 457–464). The first exists when there is
anti-corruption legislation without an independent agency. The best example
of a country with this pattern of corruption control is Mongolia. The Law on
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Anti-Corruption (LAC) is ineffective; no Mongolian public official has been
convicted even though it has been in existence since April, 1996. As there is
no independent anti-corruption agency, the task of controlling corruption in
Mongolia is shared among the police, the General Prosecutor’s Office, and the
courts (Quah, 1999b: 19–22). Corruption is a way of life in Mongolia because
of the low salaries of public officials, the ample opportunities for corruption,
and the low level of LAC enforcement.
The second pattern combines anti-corruption legislation with several agen-
cies, as exemplified in India and the Philippines. In India, the Prevention of
Corruption Act (POCA) is implemented by the Central Bureau of Investi-
gation, the Central Vigilance Commission, and anti-corruption bureaus and
vigilance commissions at the state level. Similarly, in the Philippines, the
anti-graft laws and policies are supplemented by the Sandiganbayan (special
anti-corruption court), the Ombudsman, and the PCAGC. This pattern is also
ineffective: anti-corruption laws have not been impartially enforced by the
agencies because of the lack of political will. Indeed, what is lacking in the
Philippines’ anti-corruption strategy is not adequate measures but rather the
political will to implement these measures and apprehend those found guilty
of corruption regardless of their status or position in society.
The third and most effective pattern of curbing corruption involves com-
prehensive anti-corruption legislation impartially implemented by an inde-
pendent anti-corruption agency. The best examples are Singapore and Hong
Kong; it is not surprising that they are perceived to be the two least corrupt
societies in Asia (Quah, 1999a: 22–26).
South Korea has shifted from Pattern 1 to Pattern 3 since 1999. The BAI
was created in 1963 to implement the anti-corruption strategy even though
it was an audit agency and not an anti-corruption agency. This anomaly was
finally rectified in July, 2001 with the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Act,
and the creation of the KICAC to implement the Anti-Corruption Act in Jan-
uary, 2002. Korea has sought to reduce both the incentives and opportunities
for corruption; in contrast, the Philippines has adopted an incremental strategy
since the 1950s, which has been ineffective because of a lack of political will.
Successive presidents have chosen to “muddle through” by creating their own
agencies to treat the symptoms without attacking the causes of corruption.
Conclusion: Democratization and corruption
Has democratization in the Philippines and South Korea minimized, or exac-
erbated, the problem of corruption? Huntington (1968: 59–61) observed that
modernization contributes to corruption for three reasons: (1) it involves a
change in the basic values of the society; (2) it creates new sources of wealth
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and power; and (3) it expands governmental authority and multiplies the ac-
tivities subjected to governmental regulation. Indeed, “the multiplication of
laws thus multiplies the possibilities of corruption” (Huntington, 1968: 62).
Harriss-White and White add that “in some contexts . . . the amount of cor-
ruption has increased along with and apparently as [a] result of economic
liberalization” (quoted in Ghosh et al., 1997: 18).
Economic growth and democratization in South Korea, too, have increased
the opportunities for corruption. In 1945, corruption was not a serious prob-
lem; it did not become rampant until the country’s rapid growth in the 1970s
and 1980s. Shin Hae-Nam observes that “Ironically, corruption grew as people
became more affluent, and it was probably because of people’s new thinking
that put material values ahead of moral values” (Straits Times, 1993: 11).
Unlike South Korea, the Philippines is rich in natural resources. Still it
declined from being one of Asia’s richest countries in the 1950s to one of the
poorest in the 1980s (Andrews, 2001: 150). A 1997 World Bank study on the
Philippines was sub-titled: “Three Decades of Lost Opportunities” (Kharas,
1997). Many factors are responsible for the country’s dismal economic per-
formance, but pervasive graft and corruption, especially during the Marcos
regime, resulted in an estimated loss of US$48 billion during the past 20 years
(Torrijos, 1999: 4).
The relationship between democratization and corruption is complex and
reciprocal. This interaction has been best expressed by Revel (1993: 229):
“The best obstacle to corruption is democratic control, and by corollary,
corruption is one of the most pernicious ways of subverting democracy.”
Democracy provides citizens with “an opportunity to punish governments that
fail to control corruption” (Ghosh et al., 1997: 20), but as Rose-Ackerman
(1996: 376) points out, “in democracies the desire for re-election will de-
ter corruption so long as the electorate disapproves of the practice and has
some way of sorting out valid from invalid accusations.” If the likelihood
of re-election is low (because of a decline in popularity) or zero (if the law
prohibits re-election), politicians will have “an incentive to extract as much
wealth as possible from their remaining hold on power” as their retirement
becomes imminent.
Palmier’s (1985: 271–272) comparative study of corruption control in
Hong Kong, India, and Indonesia identifies three major causes of corruption:
opportunities (which depend on the extent of involvement of civil servants
in the administration or control of lucrative activities), salaries, and policing
(the probability of detection and punishment). More specifically,
Bureaucratic corruption seems to depend not on any one of the [three]
factors identified, but rather on the balance between them. At one extreme,
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with few opportunities, good salaries, and effective policing, corruption
will be minimal; at the other, with many opportunities, poor salaries, and
weak policing, it will be considerable [emphasis added].
If we apply Palmier’s analysis to anti-corruption strategies in the
Philippines and South Korea, it is obvious that corruption in both countries can
be attributed to the low salaries of civil servants, the ample opportunities for
corruption, and the low degree of policing. In the Philippines, employees of
the Bureau of Immigration are paid “starvation wages,” and find it difficult to
survive without accepting bribes. Junior policemen are paid such low salaries
that they are forced to live in the slums with other criminal elements. Some
agencies like the Bureau of Immigration, Customs Department, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports, Department of Public Works and Highways,
and Bureau of Internal Revenue are more vulnerable to corruption because of
their contact with the public and their regulatory functions.
Ineffective policing in the Philippines is reflected in a conviction rate of
less than 2% of reported cases in 1997 and 1998. While the ICAC in Hong
Kong successfully prosecuted 8.24 corruption cases per 10,000 civil servants
in 1997, the comparable figure for the Ombudsman in the Philippines was less
than 0.25 cases per 10,000. “The probability that a Hong Kong civil servant
will be successfully prosecuted for corruption is almost 35 times greater than
his or her counterpart in the Philippines” (Beschel, 1999: 8).
In the case of South Korea, Woo-Cummings (1995: 455–456) has recom-
mended that civil service salaries, which constitute only 70% of private sector
wages, should be improved to reduce corruption. Similarly, Jun and Yoon
(1996: 107) suggest that while “no one questions the importance of honesty,
integrity and dedication in public employees,” it is unrealistic to expect them
“to show dedication without providing adequate remuneration and chang-
ing the administrative culture.” Current reforms include the improvement of
salaries of middle and junior civil servants to levels found in the private sector
within 5 years (Republic of Korea, 1999: 14).
Extensive regulation in South Korean provides ample opportunities for
corruption. To build a factory one must prepare an average of 44 documents for
the permit application, which then takes several months for approval (Myoung-
soo Kim, 1997: 261). In 1998 President Kim formed the Regulatory Reform
Committee (RRC) to make the country more business-friendly by eliminating
unnecessary regulations. During its first year the RRC abolished 5326 (or 48%)
of the 11,125 administrative regulations (Republic of Korea, 1998).
Finally, the level of policing in South Korea is higher than that in the
Philippines. Kim’s strategy aims at improved detection and punishment
through the following measures:
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1. Strengthening the reward system for informers.
2. Activating Citizen Watch for inspecting and auditing of government activ-
ities by citizens.
3. Reinforcing detection of corrupt officials by establishing a special inspec-
tion office in the Public Prosecutions Administration to focus on the cor-
ruption of senior government officials, making property registration of
civil servants more systematic, and introducing a law prohibiting money
laundering.
4. Strengthening punishment against corrupt public officials by prohibiting
them from being employed in the private sector for 5 years and in the civil
service for 15 years, punishing both bribe-givers and bribe-takers equally,
and increasing the financial penalty (Republic of Korea, 1999: 19–20).
In sum, democratization in the Philippines and South Korea is, by itself,
an inadequate deterrent against corruption, especially when the causes for
such behavior have not been dealt with. As the critical variable is the political
will of the leaders, it is not surprising that South Korea is making much more
progress than the Philippines. It is unlikely that South Korea can attain the rank
of 20th position soon, given its ranking of 42nd position in 2001. Nevertheless,
the adoption of the third pattern of corruption control in South Korea augurs
well for the future as long as President Kim Dae Jung’s successor remains
committed to the eradication of corruption in South Korean society.
Notes
1. See Table 2 for details of the CPI rankings for both countries from 1995 to 2001.
2. See the case studies on these two countries in Diamond et al. (1989), Gaerlan (1999),
Laothamatas (1997), Leipziger (1997), Lipset (1998), Marsh et al. (1999) and Robinson
(1991).
3. For a detailed analysis of the BAI’s role, see Kim (1985).
4. For more details on the Seojungshaeshin, see Oh (1982).
5. On May 17, 1997, Kim’s son was arrested for bribery and tax evasion in the Hanbo loan
scandal and was sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment 5 months later.
6. For more information on the 2001 CPI, see http://www.transparency.org/documents/
cpi/2001/cpi2001.html.
7. See PERC, “Corruption in Asia in 2001”, http://www.asiarisk.com/l1b10.html.
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